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Abstract
We consider a stochastic version of the well-known Blotto game, called the
gladiator game. In this zero-sum allocation game two teams of gladiators en-
gage in a sequence of one-to-one fights in which the probability of winning is
a function of the gladiators’ strengths. Each team’s strategy consist the allo-
cation of its total strength among its gladiators. We find the Nash equilibria
and the value of this class of games and show how they depend on the total
strength of teams and the number of gladiators in each team. To do this, we
study interesting majorization-type probability inequalities concerning linear
combinations of Gamma random variables. Similar inequalities have been used
in models of telecommunications and research and development.
Keywords and phrases: Allocation game, gladiator game, sum of exponential
random variables, Nash equilibrium, probability inequalities, unimodal distri-
bution.
MSC 2000 subject classification: Primary 60E15, 91A05; secondary 91A60.
OR/MS subject classification: Primary: games/group decisions–noncooperative;
secondary: probability–distribution comparisons.
1 Introduction
Borel (1921) proposed a game, later dubbed Colonel Blotto game by Gross and
Wagner (1950). In this game Colonel Blotto and his enemy each have a given (possibly
unequal) amount of resources, that have to be allocated to n battlefields. The side
that allocates more resources to field j is the winner in this field and gains a positive
amount aj which the other side loses. The war is won by the army that obtains the
largest total gain.
The relevance of Borel precursory insight in the theory of games was discussed in
an issue of Econometrica that contains three papers by Borel, including the translation
of the 1921 paper (Borel, 1953), two notes by Fre´chet (1953b,a) and one by von
Neumann (1953).
Borel and Ville (1938) proposed a solution to the game when the two enemies
have an equal amount of resources and there are n = 3 battlefields. The problem was
then taken up by several authors, including several other famous mathematicians.
Gross and Wagner (1950), Gross (1950) provided the solution for a generic n, keeping
the amount of resources equal and the gain in each battlefield constant (ai = aj).
Blackett (1954, 1958) considered the case where the payoff to Colonel Blotto in each
battlefields is an increasing function of his resources and a decreasing function of his
enemy’s resources. Bellman (1969) showed the use of dynamic programming to solve
the Blotto game. Shubik and Weber (1981) studied a more complex model where
there exist complementaries among the fields being defended. In this case the total
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payoff depends on the relative value of capturing various configurations of targets.
Roberson (2006) used n-copulas to determine the mixed equilibrium of the game under
general conditions on the amount of resources for each player. His analysis is based on
an interesting analogy with the theory of all-pay auctions (see also Weinstein (2005)
for the equilibrium of the game and Sahuguet and Persico (2006) for the connection
between all-pay auctions and allocation of electoral promises).
Hart (2008) considered a discrete version of the Blotto game, where player A has
A alabaster marbles and player B has B black marbles. The players are to distribute
their marbles into K urns. One urn is chosen at random and the player with the
largest number of marbles in the chosen urn wins the game. In another version of the
game, called Colonel Lotto game, each player has K urns where she can distribute
her marbles. Two urns (one for each player) are chosen at random and the urn with
the larger number of marbles determines the winner. The discrete Colonel Blotto
game and the Colonel Lotto game have the same value. In a third version, called
General Lotto game, given a, b > 0, player A chooses a nonnegative integer-valued
random variable X with expectation E[X] = a and player B chooses a nonnegative
integer-valued random variable Y with expectation E[Y ] = b. The payoff for A is
P(X > Y )− P(X < Y ), where X and Y are assumed independent. The value of the
game and the optimal strategies are determined.
Other authors who dealt with the Blotto game and its applications include, for
instance, Tukey (1949), Sion and Wolfe (1957), Friedman (1958), Cooper and Restrepo
(1967), Penn (1971), Heuer (2001), Kvasov (2007), Adamo and Matros (2009), Powell
(2009), Golman and Page (2009) and many more. We refer to Kovenock and Roberson
(2010), Chowdhury, Kovenock, and Sheremeta (2010) for some history of the Colonel
Blotto game and a good list of references.
In this paper we deal with a stochastic version of the Colonel Blotto game, called
gladiator game by Kaminsky, Luks, and Nelson (1984). In their model two teams of
gladiators engage in a sequence of one-to-one fights. Each gladiator has a strength
parameter. When two gladiators fight, the ratio of their strengths determines the
odds of winning. The loser dies and the winner retains his strength and is ready for
a new duel. The team that is wiped out loses. Each team chooses once and for all at
the beginning of the game the order in which gladiators go to the arena.
We construct a zero-sum two-team game where each team also has to allocate
a fixed total strength among its players. The payoff is linear in the probability of
winning. We find the Nash equilibria and compute the value of the game. The main
results are:
(i) the order according to which gladiators fight has no relevance, moreover knowing
the order chosen by the opponent team does not provide any advantage;
(ii) the stronger team always splits its strength uniformly among its gladiators,
whereas the weaker team splits the strength uniformly among a subset of its
gladiators;
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(iii) when the two teams have roughly equal total strengths, the optimal strategy for
the weaker team is to divide its total strength equally among all its members;
(iv) when the total strength of one team is much larger than that of the other, the
weaker team should concentrate all the strength on a single member.
De Schuymer, De Meyer, and De Baets (2006) consider a dice game that has some
analogies with ours. Both players can choose one of many dice having n faces and
such that the total number of pips on the faces of the die is σ. The two dice are
tossed and the player with the highest score wins a dollar.
The model described below for the probability that gladiator i defeats j, is equiv-
alent, with different parametrization, to the well-known Rasch model in educational
statistics, (Rasch, 1980), in which the probability of correct response of subject i to
item j is eαi−βj /(1 + eαi−βj) (see Lauritzen, 2008, for a recent mathematical study of
Rasch models). A similar model has been used also in the theory of contests proposed
by Tullock (1980), as will be described in Section 7.
Finding the Nash equilibria of the gladiator game involves an analysis of the
probability of winning. The key step is a result in Kaminsky et al. (1984) that
translates the calculation of this probability into an inequality involving the sum of
independent but not necessarily identically distributed exponential random variables.
The main theorems are demonstrated through interesting and hard probability
inequalities, whose proofs are of independent interest and turned out to be more
complicated than expected. Much of the paper consists of these proofs. We rely
on Sze´kely and Bakirov (2003) for some of the technical machinery. The problem is
cast as a minimization problem involving convolutions of exponential variables and is
solved by perturbation arguments. A key identity, derived using Laplace transforms,
directs our perturbation arguments to the analysis of the modal location of Gamma
convolutions.
Our inequalities are related to majorization type inequalities for probabilities of
the form P(Q < t), where Q is a linear combinations of Exponential or Gamma
variables, that appear in Bock, Diaconis, Huffer, and Perlman (1987), Diaconis and
Perlman (1990), Sze´kely and Bakirov (2003) and in Telatar (1999), Jorswieck and
Boche (2003), Abbe, Huang, and Telatar (2011). The motivation in the last three pa-
pers, and numerous others, is the performance of some wireless systems that depends
on the coefficients of the linear combination Q. For stochastic comparisons between
such linear combinations see Yu (2008, 2011) and references therein.
Linear combinations of exponential variables appear in various other applications.
For instance Lippman and McCardle (1987) consider a two-firm model in which learn-
ing is stochastic and the research race is divided into a finite number N of stages, each
having an exponential completion date. The invention is discovered at the completion
of the N -th stage. If the exponential times for one firm have parameters that can be
controlled by the firms subject to constraints, then our results apply to the problem
of best response and equilibrium allocation strategies for such races.
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Finally, it is well known that the first passage time from 0 to N of a birth and death
process on the positive integers is distributed as a linear combination of exponential
random variables, with coefficients determined by the eigenvalues of the process’
generator. For a clear statement, a probabilistic proof, and further references see
Diaconis and Miclo (2009). This allows one to consider R&D type races in which one
can also move backwards, and applies, for example, to the study of queues, where one
compares the time until different systems reach a given queue size.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model. In Section 3
we determine the Nash equilibria and the value of the game for different values of the
parameters. Section 4 contains the main probability inequalities used to compute the
equilibria. Section 5 is devoted to the proofs of the main results. Section 6 deals
with some monotonicity properties, that follow from our main result and have some
interest per se. Finally Section 7 contains some extensions and open problems.
2 The model
We formalize the model described in the Introduction. Two teams of gladia-
tors fight each other according to the following rules. Team A is an ordered set
{A1, . . . , Am} of m gladiators and team B is an ordered set {B1, . . . , Bn} of n glad-
iators. The numbers m,n and the orders of the gladiators in the two teams are
exogenously given. At any given time, only two gladiators fight, one for each team.
At the end of each fight only one gladiator survives. In each team gladiators go to
fight according to the exogenously given order. First gladiators A1 and B1 fight. The
winner remains in the arena and fights the following gladiator of the opposing team.
Assume that for i < m and j < n at some point, Ai fights Bj. If Ai wins, the follow-
ing fight will be between Ai and Bj+1; if Ai loses, the following fight will be between
Ai+1 and Bj. The process goes on until a team is wiped out. The other team is then
proclaimed the winner. So if at some point, for some i ≤ m, gladiator Ai fights Bn
and wins, then team A is the winner. Symmetrically if, for some j ≤ n, Am fights Bj
and loses, then team B is the winner.
Team A has total strength cA and team B has total strength cB. The values cA
and cB are exogenously given. Before fights start the coach of each team decides
how to allocate the total strength to the gladiators of the team. These decisions
are simultaneous and cannot be altered during the play. Let a = (a1, . . . , am) and
b = (b1, . . . , bn) be the strength vectors of team A and B, respectively. This means
that in team A gladiator Ai gets strength ai and in team B gladiator Bj gets strength
bj. The vectors a, b are nonnegative and such that
m∑
i=1
ai = cA,
n∑
j=1
bj = cB,
namely, each coach distributes all the available strength among the gladiators of his
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team.
When a gladiator with strength a fights a gladiator with strength b, the first
defeats the second with probability
a
a+ b
, (2.1)
all fights being independent. When a gladiator wins a fight his strength remains
unaltered. The rules of the play and its parameters, i.e., the teams A and B and the
strengths cA, cB, are common knowledge. Call Gm,n(a, b) the probability that team
A with strength vector a wins over team B with strength vector b.
The above model gives rise to the zero-sum two-person game
G (m,n, cA, cB) = 〈A (m, cA),B(n, cB), Hm,n〉 (2.2)
in which team A chooses a ∈ A (m, cA) and B chooses b ∈ B(n, cB), where
A (m, cA) =
{
(a1, . . . , am) ∈ Rm+ :
m∑
i=1
ai = cA
}
, (2.3)
B(n, cB) =
{
(b1, . . . , bn) ∈ Rn+ :
n∑
i=1
bi = cB
}
, (2.4)
Hm,n = Gm,n − 1
2
. (2.5)
The payoff of team A is then its probability of victory Gm,n(a, b) minus 1/2. We
subtracted 1/2 to make the game zero-sum.
As will be shown in Remark 4.2 below, other models with different rules of en-
gagement for the gladiators give rise to the same zero-sum game.
3 Main results
Consider the game G defined in (2.2). The action a∗ is a best response against b
if
a∗ ∈ arg max
a∈A
Hm,n(a, b).
A pair of actions (a∗, b∗) is a Nash equilibrium of the game G if
Hm,n(a, b
∗) ≤ Hm,n(a∗, b∗) ≤ Hm,n(a∗, b), for all a ∈ A (m, cA) and b ∈ B(n, cB).
A pair of actions (a∗, b∗) is a minmax solution of the game G if
max
a∈A (m,cA)
min
b∈B(n,cB)
Hm,n(a, b) = min
b∈B(n,cB)
max
a∈A (m,cA)
Hm,n(a, b) = Hm,n(a
∗, b∗).
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Since we are dealing with a finite zero-sum game, Nash equilibria and minmax
solutions coincide (see, e.g., Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994, Proposition 22.2). The
quantity Hm,n(a
∗, b∗) is called the value of the game G .
The next theorem characterizes the structure of Nash equilibria of the game
G (m,n, cA, cB).
Theorem 3.1. Consider the game G (m,n, cA, cB) defined in (2.2). Assume that
cA ≤ cB.
(a) There exists an equilibrium strategy profile (a∗, b∗) of G such that for some J ⊆
{1, . . . ,m} we have
a∗i = cA/|J | for i ∈ J, a∗i = 0 for i ∈ J c, (3.1)
b∗i = cB/n for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. (3.2)
Moreover, all pure equilibria are of this form.
(b) If
cB ≤ n
n− 1cA, (3.3)
then J = {1, . . . ,m}, so that a∗1 = · · · = a∗m = cA/m and b∗1 = · · · = b∗n = cB/n.
(c) If
cB ≥ 3n
2(n− 1)cA, (3.4)
then J = {i}, that is a∗i = cA for some i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and a∗j = 0 for all j 6= i,
and b∗1 = · · · = b∗n = cB/n.
(d) Let t0 = 1.256431 · · · be the root of the equation et = 1 + 2t. Then for fixed m,
and cA and cB such that cB > t0cA, the same conclusion as in (c) holds if n is
sufficiently large.
Theorem 3.1 shows that if a vector (a∗, b∗) is an equilibrium, then so is any
permutation of a∗ or b∗. Moreover the team with the highest total strength always
divides it equally among its members, whereas the other team divides its strength
equally among a subset of its members. This subset coincides with the whole team if
the total strengths of the two teams are similar, and it reduces to one single gladiator
if the team has a much lower strength than the other team (see Figures 1, 2, and 3).
FIGURES 1, 2, AND 3 ABOUT HERE
For n = 1, i.e., when team B has a single player, equal strength is always team
A’s best strategy.
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In order to compute the value of the game G (m,n, cA, cB), we need the regularized
incomplete beta function
I(x, α, β) =
1
B(α, β)
∫ x
0
tα−1(1− t)β−1 dt, (3.5)
where
B(α, β) =
∫ 1
0
tα−1(1− t)β−1 dt = Γ(α)Γ(β)
Γ(α + β)
.
When α and β are integers, then
I(x, α, β) =
α+β−1∑
j=α
(
α + β − 1
j
)
xj(1− x)α+β−1−j. (3.6)
For properties of incomplete beta functions see, for instance, Olver, Lozier, Boisvert,
and Clark (2010).
Theorem 3.2. Consider the game G (m,n, cA, cB). Assume that cA ≤ cB.
(a) The value of the game is
1
2
− I
(
rcB
rcB + ncA
, r, n
)
, (3.7)
where r is the number of positive a∗i in the vector a
∗. In particular
(b) if (3.3) holds, then the value of the game is
1
2
− I
(
mcB
mcB + ncA
,m, n
)
, (3.8)
(c) if (3.4) holds, then the value of the game is
1
2
− I
(
cB
cB + ncA
, 1, n
)
. (3.9)
In general, to compute the value of the game, one only needs to maximize (3.7)
over r = 1, . . . ,m; any maximizing r gives an optimal strategy for team A. Figure 4
shows the value of the game as cB varies. Different values of cB imply different
numbers of positive a∗i .
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE
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4 Probability inequalities
We say that X ∼ Exp(1) if X has a standard exponential distribution, i.e., P(X >
x) = e−x for x > 0.
The main theorems of this paper rely on the following result.
Proposition 4.1. [Kaminsky et al. (1984)] The probability Gm,n(a, b) of team A
defeating B is
Gm,n(a, b) = P
(
m∑
i=1
aiXi >
n∑
j=1
bjYj
)
, (4.1)
where X1, . . . , Xm, Y1, . . . , Yn are i.i.d. random variables, with X1 ∼ Exp(1).
Remark 4.2. The implication of Proposition 4.1 is that two vectors a,a′ of strengths
that are equal up to a permutation produce the same probability of victory, that is,
the same payoff function (2.5). The same holds for two vectors b, b′. Therefore various
models, with different rules for the order in which gladiators fight, give rise to the
same game (2.2). This happens, for instance, in a model where the winning gladiator
does not stay in the arena to fight the following opponent, but, rather, goes to the
bench at the end of his team’s queue, and comes back to fight when his turn comes.
This happens also when, at the end of each fight, each coach chooses one of the living
gladiators in his team at random and sends him to fight. Basically, provided the
allocations of strength in the two teams is decided simultaneously at the beginning
and is not modified throughout, any rule governing the order of descent of gladiators
in the arena leads to the same game (2.2). This is true also for nonanticipative rules
that depend on the history of the battles so far. The key assumption for this is the
fact that a winning gladiator does not lose (or gain) any strength after a victorious
battle. This is parallel to the lack-of-memory property in many reliability models, and
explains why the probability of winning (4.1) involves sums of exponential random
variables.
Note that the main result (Theorem 3.1) does not go through if the allocations
can also be decided dynamically as battles unfold. In this case the resulting game
is more complicated and optimal allocations may change according to the observed
history. For instance consider the case where cB is slightly larger than cA. At the
beginning, suppose team B spreads the strength uniformly across all its players. If
team B keeps losing some battles, then it may become optimal to spread the strength
among only a subset of the surviving players.
The following theorem is the main tool to prove Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 4.3. Let X1, . . . , Xm and Y1, . . . , Yn, m,n ≥ 1, be i.i.d. random variables
with X1 ∼ Exp(1). For fixed b > 0, let A be as in (2.3) and let
(a∗1, . . . , a
∗
m) ∈ arg min
a∈A (m,m)
P
(
m∑
i=1
aiXi ≤ b
n∑
j=1
Yj
)
.
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Then
(a) all nonzero values among a∗1, . . . , a
∗
m are equal;
(b) if m ≥ (n− 1)b, then a∗1 = · · · = a∗m = 1;
(c) if m ≤ 2(n− 1)b/3, then a∗i = m for a single i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and a∗j = 0, for j 6= i.
5 Proofs of the main results
The long path to the proof of Theorem 3.1 goes through the following steps: first
we provide a short proof of Proposition 4.1 for the sake of completeness. Then we
state and prove three lemmas needed for the proof of Theorem 4.3. Then we prove
Theorem 4.3, and, resorting to it, we finally prove Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. First note that if X, Y are i.i.d. random variables with
X ∼ Exp(1), then P(aX > bY ) = a/(a + b). Therefore, one can see a duel between
gladiators i and j as a competition in which the probability of winning is the prob-
ability of living longer, when their lifetimes are aiX and bjY , respectively. At the
end of a duel, the winner’s remaining lifetime is as good as new by the memoryless
property of exponential random variables, corresponding to the fact that the strength
of a winner remains unaltered. The teams’ total lives are
∑m
i=1 aiXi and
∑n
j=1 bjYj,
and the probability that team A wins is that it lives longer, which is Gm,n(a, b), so
(4.1) follows.
In order to prove Theorem 4.3 we need several preliminary results. LetG1, G2, Z1, Z2
be independent with Gi ∼ Gamma(ui, 1), Zi ∼ Exp(1), for i = 1, 2. For ui = 0 we
define Gi = 0 with probability 1.
Lemma 5.1. Given a∗1, a
∗
2, set a1 = a
∗
1 + δ/u1 and a2 = a
∗
2 − δ/u2. Then
∂
∂δ
P(a1G1 + a2G2 ≤ x) = (a1 − a2) ∂
2
∂x2
P(a1(G1 + Z1) + a2(G2 + Z2) ≤ x). (5.1)
Proof. Let
F (x) = P(a1G1 + a2G2 ≤ x)
H(x) = P(a1G1 + a2G2 + a1Z1 + a2Z2 ≤ x)
and let f and h denote the corresponding densities. Let L denote the Laplace
transform, that is,
L (F ) =
∫ ∞
0
e−tx F (x) dx.
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Note that (5.1) is equivalent to
L
(
∂
∂δ
F (x)
)
= (a1 − a2)L
(
∂2
∂x2
H(x)
)
. (5.2)
Using integration by parts we get
L
(
∂2
∂x2
H(x)
)
= t
∫ ∞
0
e−tx h(x) dx = t E[exp{−t(a1G1 + a2G2 + a1Z1 + a2Z2)}].
For the left hand side of (5.2) note that we can interchange differentiation and inte-
gration, and also that
∂
∂δ
L (F (x)) = L (F (x))
∂
∂δ
logL (F (x)).
Again by integration by parts we have
L (F (x)) =
1
t
L (f(x)) =
1
t
E[exp{−t(a1G1 + a2G2)}].
It follows that (5.2) is equivalent to
1
t
∂
∂δ
logL (f(x)) = (a1 − a2) t E[exp{−t(a1Z1 + a2Z2)}]. (5.3)
Explicitly this becomes
1
t
∂
∂δ
log[(1 + a1t)
−u1(1 + a2t)−u2 ] = (a1 − a2)t(1 + a1t)−1(1 + a2t)−1. (5.4)
Using a1 = a
∗
1 + δ/u1, and a2 = a
∗
2 − δ/u2, (5.4) is verified by a straightforward
calculation.
A related result to Lemma 5.1, with a similar type of proof, appears in Sze´kely
and Bakirov (2003).
Lemma 5.2. Given a nonnegative vector (a∗1, . . . , a
∗
m), let
a1 = a
∗
1 + δ/u1, a2 = a
∗
2 − δ/u2, ai = a∗i for 3 ≤ i ≤ m.
Define
Q(a,u) =
m∑
i=1
aiGi − b
n∑
j=1
Yj, (5.5)
where (a,u) := (a1, . . . , am, u1, . . . , um), G1, . . . , Gm, Y1, . . . , Yn are independent ran-
dom variables with Gi ∼ Gamma(ui, 1), for i = 1, . . . ,m and Yj ∼ Exp(1), for
j = 1, . . . , n. Let Zi ∼ Exp(1), for i = 1, 2 be independent of all other variables.
Then
∂
∂δ
P(Q(a,u) ≤ x) = (a1 − a2) ∂
2
∂x2
P(Q(a,u) + a1Z1 + a2Z2 ≤ x). (5.6)
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Proof. Set T =
∑m
i=3 aiGi − b
∑n
j=1 Yj. Then
∂
∂δ
P(Q(a,u) ≤ x|T ) = (a1 − a2) ∂
2
∂x2
P(Q(a,u) + a1Z1 + a2Z2 ≤ x|T ), (5.7)
which is equivalent to (5.1) with a different x. Taking the expectation in (5.7) over
T yields (5.6).
Lemma 5.3. Let X and Y be independent random variables where Y ∼ Exp(1) and
X has a density f(x) such that
(i) f(x) is continuously differentiable with a bounded derivative on (−∞,∞),
(ii) f(x) > 0 for sufficiently small x ∈ (−∞,∞),
(iii) f(x) is unimodal, i.e., there exists a ∈ (−∞,∞) such that f ′(x) ≥ 0 if x < a
and f ′(x) ≤ 0 if x > a.
For λ > 0, denote the density of X + λY by fλ(x). Then fλ(x) is unimodal and if
f ′λ(x0) = 0 then x0 is a mode of fλ. Moreover, if λ > λ0 > 0, then any mode of fλ(x)
is strictly larger than any mode of fλ0(x).
Proof. This result is similar to Sze´kely and Bakirov (2003, Lemma 1). We provide a
quick proof using variation diminishing properties of sign regular kernels (see Karlin,
1968). First, since the density of λY is log-concave (a.k.a. strongly unimodal) its
convolution with the unimodal f(x) is also unimodal, that is, the pdf of X + λY is
unimodal (see Ibragimov, 1956, Karlin, 1968).
Differentiating (justified by (i)) yields
f ′λ(x) =
∫ ∞
0
f ′(x− z) 1
λ
e−z/λ dz
=
∫ x
−∞
f ′(z)
1
λ
e(z−x)/λ dz
=
e−x/λ
λ
∫
1(−∞,x)(z)f ′(z) ez/λ dz.
Suppose f ′λ(x0) = 0. Since f
′(z) ≥ 0 for z ≤ a, we know from the representation
above that f ′λ(x) > 0 if x ≤ a, and hence x0 > a. The representation also shows
that the function ex/λ f ′λ(x) is nonincreasing in x ∈ (a,∞). Therefore f ′λ(x) ≥ 0 if
x ∈ (a, x0) and f ′λ(x) ≤ 0 if x > x0. It follows that x0 is a mode of fλ(x).
For fixed x, the function 1(−∞,x)(z)f ′(z) as a function of z does not vanish (by (ii)),
and has at most one sign change from positive to negative (by (iii)), and the kernel
ez/λ is strictly reverse rule (see Karlin, 1968). It follows that
∫
1(−∞,x)(z)f ′(z) ez/λ dz
has at most one sign change from negative to positive, as a function of λ. Thus, if
for a given x, f ′λ0(x) = 0 and λ > λ0, then f
′
λ(x) > 0, and the result follows.
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Proof of Theorem 4.3. LetQ(a) := Q(a,1m) as in (5.5). Consider minimizing P(Q(a) ≤
0) over
Ω =
{
a : 0 ≤ ai,
m∑
i=1
ai = m
}
.
Since Ω is compact, and P(Q ≤ 0) is continuous in a, the minimum is attained, say,
at a∗ ∈ Ω.
Claim 5.4. In any minimizing point a∗ of P(Q ≤ 0) the a∗i ’s take at most two distinct
nonzero values. Moreover, in the case of two distinct nonzero values, the smaller one
appears only once.
Proof. Assume the contrary, say 0 < a∗1 ≤ a∗2 < a∗3. We show below in Case 1 that
more than two distinct values are impossible by showing that a∗1 < a
∗
2 leads to a
contradiction. Similarly Case 2 implies the impossibility of repetitions of the smallest
of two distinct values. Let a1 = a
∗
1 + δ, a2 = a
∗
2 − δ, ai = a∗i , 3 ≤ i ≤ m. Then by
(5.6) we have
∂
∂δ
P(Q(a) ≤ x) = (a1 − a2) ∂
2
∂x2
P(Q(a) + a1Z1 + a2Z2 ≤ x), (5.8)
where Z1 and Z2 are i.i.d. random variables with Z1 ∼ Exp(1), independent of Q.
We can focus on x = 0.
Case 1. a∗1 < a
∗
2. Since δ = 0 achieves the minimum, both sides of (5.8) with x = 0
vanish at δ = 0. The density function of Q(a∗) + a∗1Z1 is positive everywhere and
is log-concave and hence unimodal. By Lemma 5.3, S = Q(a∗) + a∗1Z1 + a
∗
2Z2 has a
mode at zero. Following Case 2 we show that this leads to a contradiction.
Case 2. a∗1 = a
∗
2. Then (5.8) gives
lim
δ↓0
∂P(Q(a) ≤ 0)
∂δ
= 0
and
∂2
∂δ2
P(Q(a) ≤ 0)
∣∣∣∣
δ=0
= 2 lim
δ→0
∂2
∂x2
P(Q(a) + a1Z1 + a2Z2 ≤ x)
∣∣∣∣
x=0
.
A minimum at δ = 0 entails
∂2
∂x2
P(Q(a∗) + a∗1Z1 + a∗2Z2 ≤ x)
∣∣∣∣
x=0
≥ 0,
showing that S = Q(a∗) + a∗1Z1 + a
∗
2Z2 has a mode that is nonnegative.
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Thus S has a nonnegative mode in either case. By Lemma 5.3 and a∗2 < a
∗
3, any
mode of Q(a∗) + a∗1Z1 + a
∗
3Z2 is strictly positive, i.e.,
∂2
∂x2
P(Q(a∗) + a∗1Z1 + a∗3Z2 ≤ x)
∣∣∣∣
x=0
> 0.
The latter expression, multiplied by (a∗1−a∗3) is negative. Using (5.8) with a∗3 in place
of a∗2, however, this implies that P(Q(a) ≤ 0) strictly decreases under the perturbation
(a∗1, a
∗
3)→ (a∗1 + δ, a∗3 − δ) for small δ > 0, which is a contradiction to the minimality
at δ = 0. Note that the crux of the proof is in comparing two perturbations.
Claim 5.5. In any minimizing point a∗ of P(Q ≤ 0) the a∗i ’s are either all equal, or
take only two distinct values, in which case one of them is zero.
Proof. Assume the contrary, and in view of Claim 5.4, suppose we have
0 < a∗1 < a
∗
2 = · · · = a∗k+1, 1 ≤ k < m, a∗k+2 = · · · = a∗m = 0, and
m∑
i=1
a∗i = m.
Then for some δ ∈ (0, 1/k), a∗1, . . . , a∗m must be of the form
a∗1 = (1− kδ)m/(k + 1), a∗2 = · · · = a∗k+1 = (1 + δ)m/(k + 1), a∗k+2 = · · · = a∗m = 0.
We then have
k + 1
m
Q(a) = (1− kδ)X + (1 + δ)G− λY, λ = b(k + 1)
m
,
with X ∼ Exp(1), G ∼ Gamma(k, 1), Y ∼ Gamma(n, 1) independently. We show
that the minimum of P(Q(a) ≤ 0) cannot be achieved in the open interval δ ∈ (0, 1/k),
contradicting the assumption that a∗ is a minimizer. We have
P(Q(a) ≤ 0) = P
(
1 + δ(1− (k + 1)B) ≤ λY
X +G
)
,
where B := X/(X + G). Note that B has a Beta(1, k) distribution, Y/(X + G) has
a scaled F (2n, 2(k + 1)) distribution, and B and Y/(X +G) are independent. Thus
P(Q(a) ≤ 0) = C1 E
[∫ ∞
1+δ(1−(k+1)B)
yn−1
(λ+ y)n+k+1
dy
]
.
where above and below, Ci > 0 denote constants that do not depend on δ, and
Di(δ) > 0 denote functions of δ ∈ (0, 1/k), and both may depend on other constants
such as λ, k, etc. It follows that
∂P(Q(a) ≤ 0)
∂δ
= −C1 E
[
(1− (k + 1)B) (1 + δ(1− (k + 1)B))
n−1
(λ+ 1 + δ(1− (k + 1)B))n+k+1
]
= −C2
∫ 1
−k
x(x+ k)k−1
(1 + δx)n−1
(λ+ 1 + δx)n+k+1
dx (5.9)
= −D1(δ)g(δ), (5.10)
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where
g(δ) :=
∫ p
1
[(λ+ 1− δk)(y − 1)− δkλy] yn−1(y − 1)k−1 dy,
p = p(δ) :=
(1 + δ)(λ+ 1− δk)
(λ+ 1 + δ)(1− δk) ,
and (5.10) uses the change of variables
y =
(1 + δx)(λ+ 1− δk)
(λ+ 1 + δx)(1− δk) .
Using the closed form integral∫ p
1
[ky + n(y − 1)] yn−1(y − 1)k−1 dy = pn(p− 1)k
we get
g′(δ) =
λδ(λ+ 1− δk)
λ+ 1 + δ
pn−1(p− 1)k−1p′(δ) +
∫ p
1
k(1− (λ+ 1)y)yn−1(y − 1)k−1 dy
=
λδ(λ+ 1− δk)
λ+ 1 + δ
pn−1(p− 1)k−1p′(δ) + (λn− k)g(δ)− λ(λ+ 1)p
n(p− 1)k
λ+ 1− δk + λnδ
= D2(δ)
[
k(λn− k)δ2 + (λ+ 1)(k − 1)δ + (λ+ 1)(λ(n− 1)− k − 2)]
+
(λn− k)g(δ)
λ+ 1− δk + λnδ . (5.11)
Specifically
D2(δ) =
λδpn(p− 1)k
(1 + δ)(λ+ 1 + δ)(λ+ 1− δk + λnδ) .
It is helpful to determine the sign of g(δ) for small δ > 0 and large δ < 1/k. Let us
denote the integral in (5.9) by g˜(δ), which has the same sign as g(δ) for δ ∈ (0, 1/k).
A Taylor expansion yields
g˜(δ) =
∫ 1
−k
[
x(x+ k)k−1
(λ+ 1)n+k+1
+
(λ(n− 1)− k − 2)δ
(λ+ 1)n+k+2
x2(x+ k)k−1
]
dx+ o(δ)
= C3(λ(n− 1)− k − 2)δ + o(δ), as δ ↓ 0.
By direct calculation,
g˜(1/k) = C4(λ(n− 1)− k − 1).
We distinguish three cases:
(i) λ(n− 1) > k+ 2. Then g˜(δ) > 0 and hence g(δ) > 0 for sufficiently small δ > 0.
Moreover, by (5.11), g′(δ) > D3(δ)g(δ), δ ∈ (0, 1/k). It follows that g(δ) > 0
for all δ ∈ (0, 1/k), i.e., P(Q(a) ≤ 0) decreases in δ ∈ [0, 1/k]. The same holds
in the boundary case λ(n− 1) = k + 2.
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(ii) k+1 < λ(n−1) < k+2. Then g(δ) < 0 for sufficiently small δ > 0, and g(δ) > 0
for sufficiently large δ < 1/k. If the minimum of P(Q(a) ≤ 0) is achieved at
δ∗ ∈ (0, 1/k), then g(δ∗) = 0 ≥ g′(δ∗), and g(δ) has at least one root in (0, δ∗),
say δ∗∗, such that g′(δ∗∗) ≥ 0. This contradicts (5.11), however, because the
term in square brackets strictly increases in δ.
(iii) λ(n−1) < k+1. Then g(δ) < 0 for both sufficiently large δ < 1/k and sufficiently
small δ > 0. Suppose g(δ∗) > 0 for some δ∗ ∈ (0, 1/k). If λn > k then a
contradiction results as in Case (ii). Otherwise the term in square brackets in
(5.11) is no more than
(λ+ 1)(k − 1)k−1 + (λ+ 1)(λ(n− 1)− k − 2) < 0.
Thus any δ ∈ (0, 1/k) such that g(δ) = 0 entails g′(δ) < 0. This is impossible
as g(δ) cannot cross zero from above without first doing so from below. Hence
g(δ) ≤ 0, i.e., P(Q(a) ≤ 0) increases in δ ∈ [0, 1/k]. The same holds in the
boundary case λ(n− 1) = k + 1.
We now prove the three statements of Theorem 4.3.
(a) This is an immediate consequence of Claim 5.5.
(b) Let h(k) = P(Q(a) ≤ 0) with
a1 = · · · = ak = m
k
, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, and ak+1 = · · · = am = 0.
Comparing P(Q(a) ≤ 0) in Case (iii) of the proof of Claim (5.5) at δ = 0 and
δ = 1/k, we see that if m ≥ b(n− 1), i.e.,
b(k + 1)(n− 1)
m
≤ k + 1,
then h(k + 1) < h(k), 1 ≤ k < m. Thus h(k) achieves its minimum at k = m.
(c) Suppose now m < b(n−1). According to Case (i), if b(k+ 1)(n−1)/m ≥ k+ 2,
i.e.,
k + 1 ≥ m
(b(n− 1)−m) , (5.12)
then h(k + 1) > h(k). In particular, (5.12) holds for all k if m ≤ 2b(n − 1)/3,
which yields h(m) > · · · > h(2) > h(1), i.e., h(k) is minimized at k = 1. In
general h(k) is minimized at some k ≤ dm/(b(n− 1)−m)− 1e.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. (a) Using Proposition 4.1 and Theorem 4.3(a)(b), once all
the ai are multiplied by a factor cA/m, we can prove that there exists a Nash
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equilibrium that satisfies (3.1) and (3.2), which we denote as (a∗, b∗). Assume
(a˜, b˜) is another equilibrium. Because the game is zero-sum, we have
Hm.,n(a˜, b˜) ≥ Hm,n(a∗, b˜) ≥ Hm,n(a∗, b∗)
and
Hm,n(a˜, b˜) ≤ Hm,n(a˜, b∗) ≤ Hm,n(a∗, b∗).
Thus equalities must all hold. Since b∗ (equal allocation) is the unique optimal
response to a∗, for the equality to hold in Hm,n(a∗, b˜) ≥ Hm,n(a∗, b∗) we must
have b˜ = b∗. Similarly, for the equality to hold in Hm,n(a˜, b
∗) ≤ Hm,n(a∗, b∗),
a˜ must be of the form (3.1). Thus all pure equilibria satisfy (3.1) and (3.2).
(b) Theorem 4.3(b) guarantees that if a∗1 = · · · = a∗m = cA/m and b∗1 = · · · = b∗n =
cB/n, then a
∗ is the unique best response to b∗ and vice versa. This proves
that (a∗, b∗) is a Nash equilibrium of the game. This equilibrium is unique by
the argument in part (a).
(c) Theorem 4.3(c) guarantees that if a∗i = cA for some i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and a∗j = 0
for all j 6= i, and b∗1 = · · · = b∗n = cB/n, then a∗ is a best response to b∗
and Theorem 4.3(b) guarantees that b∗ is the unique best response to a∗. This
proves that (a∗, b∗) is a Nash equilibrium of the game. Again the argument
used in part (a) shows that all Nash equilibria are of this form.
(d) Suppose team A allocates its strength equally among r players, and team B
adopts the optimal strategy of equal allocation among all n players. Then, as
n→∞, the winning probability for team A approaches f(r) := P(cAGr > rcB),
where Gr is a Gamma(r, 1) random variable. Letting β := cB/cA, we get
f(r)− f(r + 1) =
∫ ∞
rβ
rxr−1 e−x
Γ(r + 1)
dx−
∫ ∞
(r+1)β
xr e−x
Γ(r + 1)
dx
=
1
Γ(r + 1)
(
−(rβ)r e−rβ +
∫ (r+1)β
rβ
xr e−x dx
)
=
(rβ)r e−rβ
Γ(r + 1)
[∫ 1
0
(
1 +
y
r
)r
e−yβ β dy − 1
]
,
where we have integrated by parts in the second equality and changed the
variables y = x/β − r in the third. The integral inside the square brackets
obviously increases in r. Hence f(r) > f(r + 1) implies f(r + 1) > f(r + 2) >
· · · > f(m). Moreover, if β = cB/cA > t0 then f(1) > f(2) by direct calculation.
In this case f(r) is maximized at r = 1 and r = 1 is the optimal strategy for
team A in the large n limit.
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Proof of Theorem 3.2. (a) Using Theorem 3.1(a) we know that for some 1 ≤ r ≤ m
and some permutation pi we have a∗pi(1) = · · · = a∗pi(r) = cA/r, api(r+1) = · · · =
api(m) = 0, and b
∗
1 = · · · = b∗n = cB/n. Hence
m∑
i=1
a∗iXi ∼ Gamma(r, r/cA),
n∑
j=1
b∗jYj ∼ Gamma(n, n/cB).
Therefore, (see, e.g, Cook and Nadarajah, 2006, Cook, 2008)
P
(
m∑
i=1
a∗iXi >
n∑
j=1
b∗jYj
)
= 1− I
(
rcB
rcB + ncA
, r, n
)
, (5.13)
where I is the regularized incomplete beta function defined in (3.5).
(b) By Theorem 3.1(b) in this case r = m.
(c) By Theorem 3.1(c) in this case r = 1.
6 Monotonicity results
6.1 Monotonicity of the value
FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE
We mention the following consequence of Theorem 3.1 (see Figure 5).
Corollary 6.1. In the game G (m,n, cA, cB), if the two teams have equal strength
(i.e., cA = cB), then the value is positive if m > n, namely, the team with more
players has an advantage over the other team. Moreover, the value of the game is
increasing in m and decreasing in n.
Proof. The team with more players always has the option of not using them all.
Therefore it cannot be worse off than the team with fewer players. However, since
equal allocation is the unique best response, using them all is strictly better. The
same argument proves the monotonicity in m and n. Note that directly verifying this
from the properties of the incomplete beta function appears nontrivial.
FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE
Figure 6 shows an interesting implication of Theorem 3.2: team B may be at a
disadvantage even if cA < cB, and this happens if the number n of its gladiators is
much smaller than the number m of gladiators in A. As the relative difference in
strength between the two teams increases, it takes a larger number of gladiators to
compensate for the lower strength.
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FIGURES 7 AND 8 ABOUT HERE
As Figures 7 and 8 show, if condition (3.4) holds, then team A is at a strong
disadvantage. The disadvantage increases with the total strength cB and the number
n of gladiators of team B. The number m of gladiators of team A is totally irrelevant,
since, in equilibrium, the whole strength cA is assigned to only one gladiator.
6.2 Related probability inequalities
If X1, . . . , Xm, and Y1, . . . , Yn are i.i.d. random variables with X1 ∼ Exp(1), and
X¯ =
1
m
m∑
i=1
Xi, Y¯ =
1
n
n∑
j=1
Yj, Z =
mX¯
mX¯ + nY¯
,
then Z has a Beta(m,n) distribution. Hence
P(X¯ < Y¯ ) = P
(
Z <
m
m+ n
)
= I
(
m
m+ n
,m, n
)
. (6.1)
For m > n, by Corollary 6.1, we have
P(X¯ < Y¯ ) <
1
2
. (6.2)
Since E[Z] = m/(m + n), (6.2) is equivalent to P (Z < E[Z]) < 1/2, that is, E[Z] <
Med[Z]. This is a well known mean-median inequality for beta distributions (see
Groeneveld and Meeden, 1977).
The inequality (6.2) has the following interesting statistical implication. If two
statisticians estimate the mean of exponential variables, and use the sample mean as
their unbiased estimate, then the statistician with the larger sample tends to have
a larger (unbiased) estimate. If the two of them bet on who has a larger estimate,
the one with the larger sample tends to win. For normal variables, or any symmetric
variables, this clearly cannot happen and P(X¯ < Y¯ ) = 1/2.
Suppose now that the two statisticians share the first n variables, that is, for i =
1, . . . , n we have Xi = Yi, and the remaining variables Xn+1, . . . , Xm are independent
of the previous ones. Then
P(X¯ < Y¯ ) = P
(
1
m
[
n∑
j=1
Yj +
m∑
i=n+1
Xi
]
<
1
n
n∑
j=1
Yj
)
= P
(
1
m− n
m∑
i=n+1
Xi <
1
n
n∑
j=1
Yj
)
. (6.3)
By (6.2) the last expression in (6.3) is less than 1/2 if and only if m− n > n, that is,
m > 2n. It equals 1/2 if m = 2n, and it is larger than 1/2 if m < 2n, in which case
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(6.2) is reversed. Thus in the bet between the statisticians, if most of the variables
are in common, the odds are against the one with the larger sample, contrary to the
previous situation. This was noted by Abram Kagan.
Our main results can be presented in terms of various other distributional inequal-
ities or monotonicity. Using (3.6) and Corollary 6.1 we obtain further results that
cannot easily be proved more directly. We say that X ∼ Gamma(α, β) if X has a
density
f(x) =
βα
Γ(α)
e−βx xα−1, x > 0.
Corollary 6.2. For m,n integers the following properties hold:
(a) The function
I
(
m
m+ n
,m, n
)
is decreasing in m for fixed n, and increasing in n for fixed m.
(b) Let T ∼ Binom(m+ n− 1,m/(m+ n)). Then P(T ≥ m) is decreasing in m and
increasing in n.
(c) Let S ∼ Poisson(m). Then P(S ≥ m) is decreasing in m.
(d) Let R ∼ Gamma(m, 1). Then P(R ≤ m) is decreasing in m.
Proof. (a) is a restatement of the last part of Corollary 6.1.
(b) follows from (a) and (3.6).
(c) follows from (b) by letting n→∞.
(d) follows from (c) and the identity
P(S ≥ m) = 1
Γ(m)
∫ m
0
e−t tm−1 dt.
We say that a random variable Q ∼ Geom(p) if P(Q1 = k) = (1 − p)kp, k =
0, 1, 2, . . . .
Proposition 6.3. Let Q1, . . . , Qm be independent random variables such that Qi ∼
Geom(1/(1 + ai)). Define Q =
∑m
i=1Qi.
(a) We have
1−Gm,n(a,1n) = P (Q ≤ n− 1) , (6.4)
where a = (a1, . . . , am) and 1n denotes the n-dimensional vector of ones.
(b) If
∑m
i=1 ai = n, then the probability in (6.4) is minimized when all ai’s are equal.
In this case Qi are i.i.d. and Q has a negative binomial distribution.
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(c) If E[Q] = m, then E[Q] > Med[Q].
Proof. (a) The relation (6.4) can be explained directly: team A loses if all its
gladiators together defeat at most n − 1 opponents. Gladiator i from team A
defeats a geometric random number, Qi, of gladiators of strength 1 from team
B since he fights until he loses, and he loses a fight with probability 1/(1 + ai).
Thus if
∑m
i=1Qi ≤ n−1, then team A defeats at most n−1 gladiators altogether,
and loses.
(b) This follows directly from Theorem 4.3.
(c) Note that E[Q] =
∑m
i=1 ai. Letting n = m, and using (6.4) and part (b), we
conclude that P(Q ≤ n − 1) ≥ 1 − Gm,n(1m,1n) = 1/2. We obtain P(Q ≤
E[Q]) = P(Q ≤ n) > 1/2, and therefore E[Q] > Med[Q].
7 Comments and extensions
The probability in (2.1) is a particular example of contest success function1. The
following more general class was considered by Tullock (1980) with the purpose of
studying efficient rent seeking:
hγ(a, b) =
aγ
aγ + bγ
, γ > 0. (7.1)
These functions have been studied, axiomatized, and widely used in different fields
(see, e.g., Skaperdas, 1996, Szymanski, 2003, Corcho´n and Dahm, 2010, and many
others). The reader is referred to Corcho´n (2007), Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007),
Konrad (2009) for surveys on this topic.
In (7.1), when γ →∞, then
hγ(a, b)→ h∞(a, b) :=

1 if a > b,
1
2
if a = b,
0 if a < b.
This case corresponds to a classical Colonel Blotto situation where the stronger glad-
iator always wins. If the contest success function h∞ is used in our game, then any
equilibrium strategy for the stronger team assigns the whole strength to one single
gladiator, and, for cA < cB, team A loses with probability one and value of the game
is −1/2.
In (7.1), when γ → 0, then
hγ(a, b)→ h0(a, b) :=

1 if a > b = 0,
1
2
if a, b > 0,
0 if 0 = a < b.
1Hirshleifer (1989) calls it technology of conflict
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When h0 is used as a contest success function in our game, then any equilibrium
strategy assigns positive strength to every gladiator, therefore in each fight either
gladiator wins with probability 1/2 and the game reduces to one with two teams of m
and n gladiators respectively, all having equal power. Then, using (4.1), and (5.13)
we see that the probability that team A wins is equal to
Gm,n(1,1) = 1− I
(
1
2
,m, n
)
.
If a1 = · · · = am = 1, then in (6.4) the random variable Q is negative binomial. Hence
it is easy to see that
Gm,n(1,1) =
m−1∑
j=0
(
1
2
)n+j (
n+ j − 1
j
)
,
and the value of the game is obtained by subtracting 1/2.
If the extreme cases γ = 0 and γ = ∞ are easy to analyze, and the case γ = 1
required hard calculations, the remaining cases, i.e., γ 6∈ {0, 1,∞} look prohibitive in
our model. They were considered in easier to deal frameworks by some authors. For
instance, in a context of rent-seeking, when a contest success function of type (7.1) is
used, Alcalde and Dahm (2010) show that for γ ≥ 2 the structure of the equilibrium
is always the same.
Friedman (1958) and Robson (2005) consider the case γ = 1 in a static simul-
taneous battle context similar to the classical Colonel Blotto model and show that
the equilibrium strategies for both players involve splitting strength evenly across all
the battlefields. Roberson (2006) considers the case γ =∞ and shows that the equi-
librium mixed strategy of the stronger player stochastically assigns positive strength
to each battlefield, whereas the one of the weaker player gives zero strength to some
randomly selected battlefields and randomly distributes the strength among the re-
maining fields. These results bear some analogy with the structure of the equilibrium
in our game.
Tang, Shoham, and Lin (2010) consider contest games where the strengths of
players are exogenously given and coaches simultaneously choose the order of players
and then players with the corresponding position fight. This model was used by Arad
(2009).
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Figure 1: Number of positive a∗i as a function of cB for cA = 100 and various m = n.
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Figure 2: Number of positive a∗i as a function of cB for cA = 100, n = 20, and various
m.
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Figure 3: Number of positive a∗i as a function of cB for cA = 100, m = 40, and
various n.
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Figure 4: Value of G as a function of cB ∈ [100, 200] for cA = 100, m = 40, and
various n.
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Figure 5: Value of G as a function of n for m = 20 and (cA = cB).
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Figure 6: Value of G as a function of n for m = 20 and different pairs (cA, cB).
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Figure 7: Value of G as a function of n for cA = 10 and various cB.
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Figure 8: Value of G as a function of cB ≥ 20 for cA = 10 and various n.
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